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In English, John said that I feel sick today cannot mean that John uttered "I feel 
sick today." Recently, it has been observed (see Anand and Nevins 2004 and 
references cited there) that in some languages the corresponding sentence can 
mean precisely that. This suggests that at least in those languages attitude verbs 
such as say may quantify over contexts (and their embedded clause may be 
interpreted relative to a context, or contexts, different from the one relative to 
which the matrix clause is interpreted), in violation of Kaplan' s  ( 1 979) famous 
prohibition. Schlenker ( 1999, 2003) has argued that attitude verbs in all languages 
quantify over contexts , but the lexical properties of I and today, in languages such 
as English, prevent them from "shifting" their reference (this is why I and today 
in the above example refer to the speaker and the day surrounding the utterance 
time respectively). I argue that the notion 'context' ,  as usually used in the relevant 
literature, is not fine-grained enough to capture subtle contrasts between Standard 
Indirect Discourse (embedding of a clause under an attitude verb; henceforth, 
SID) and Free Indirect Discourse (henceforth, FID). FID involves quantification 
over contexts, where 'context' should be understood in its "broad" sense, namely, 
as including a variable assignment. 
FID is a literary style that narrators use to convey the point of view of a 
character in a story (usually, but not always, a written story) . ( 1 )  illustrates this .  
( 1 )  John bid me goodbye, and walked home. He would ask me to  marry him 
today(, he thought} . 
John to himself: "I will ask Yael to marry me today." 
The material that appears in parentheses is optional ; we can usually infer from the 
preceding text whose point of view is reported, and where or when the event of 
thinking or saying takes place. The paraphrase of the thought in ( 1 )  shows that he 
may be used to refer to whoever the attitude holder - in this case John - takes 
himself to be (the "embedded" author), the past tense (on would) - to the time 
where the attitude holder locates himself, men refers to the speaker (the "matrix" 
author}l and today is used to refer to the day surrounding the time where the 
attitude holder locates himself. 
In many ways FID resembles SID. In SID, too, he can be used to refer to 
the embedded author, the past tense - to the time where the attitude holder locates 
himself, and men is used to refer to the matrix author. However, in SID, unlike 
FID, today must refer to the day surrounding the time where the speaker locates 
herself, not the day surrounding the time where the attitude holder locates himself. 
Thus, (2a) is a good paraphrase of ( 1 ) , but (2b) is not. 
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(2) a. John thought that he would ask me to marry him that day. 
b. John thought that he would ask me to marry him today. 
In short, today and I are interpreted relative to the speaker in SID; but in FID I is 
interpreted relative to the speaker, today is not (see Banfield 1 982, Doron 1991) .2 
In this paper I observe additional contrasts between FID and SID, mainly 
regarding the behavior of pronouns. I argue that: (a) the English FID operator 
quantifies over "broad" contexts (and consequently over variable assignments) ;  
(b) as a result, pronouns in English FID usually do not receive their values from 
the assignment supplied by the utterance context; and (c) by contrast, attitude 
verbs in English do not quantify over "broad" contexts, and pronouns in 
complement clauses of such verbs may receive their values from the assignment 
supplied by the utterance context. 
2. An Analysis of FID Along the Lines of Doron (1991) 
Building on an idea in Banfield ( 1982), Doron ( 199 1 )  proposes a theory of FID 
which roughly says the following. The embedded clause in FID is interpreted 
relative to two contexts : the utterance context (tied to the speaker), and an 
embedded context (tied to the attitude holder). In SID, by contrast ,  the embedded 
clause is interpreted relative to the utterance context. I think Doron ' s  proposal is 
essentially correct. However, there are certain issues (e.g . ,  the interpretation of 
free 3rd person pronouns) about which Doron' s  paper is not explicit (or not 
explicit enough). In what follows I try to make explicit what I think should be part 
of any theory of FID, the part that explains the behavior of free pronouns.  
Doron' s  proposal is couched within the framework of Situation Semantics. 
My own rendition of her proposal doesn' t  make any essential use of that 
particular theory. At the risk of doing an injustice to Doron ' s  proposal ,  here is my 
rendition of it. All expressions are interpreted relative to two contexts (c and C;  C 
being the utterance context), and a (possibly partial) variable assignment. In the 
default case, c=C. A context is understood in the "broad" sense, namely, as 
<author, (addressee,) world, time, location, . . .  , assignment function>, where the 
range of the assignment function is a set of entities salient for the author of the 
context in the world/time/location of the context. The literature on attitude reports 
usually uses the notion 'context' in its "narrow" sense. (By "narrow context" I 
mean: something that is like a broad context but lacks a variable assignment. )  
The FID operator (which, I assume, is the "embedder" in FID 
constructions) is a universal quantifier over broad context-assignment pairs , and 
its complement clause denotes a function from such pairs to truth values. An 
attitude verb is a universal quantifier over narrow contexts (or perhaps over things 
that are even "smaller") ,  and its complement clause denotes a function from 
narrow contexts (or "smaller" things) to truth values. In addition to the usual rules 
we have the rules in (3) (of which (3c,d) are fairly standard), where c and C are 
any broad contexts, and g is any assignment: 
FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE AND 'DE RE' PRONOUNS 
(3) (a) For any root node S, [S]f,C,g is defined only if c=C, C is the utterance 
context, g=assignment(c), and Dom(g) is the set of indices that are 
syntactically free in S .3 
(b) [l]f'c,g is author(C) ;  [today]f,C,g is the day surrounding time(c) .  
(c) For any index j and variable (trace or pronoun) a ,  [q]f,c,g is defined 
only if j E Dom(g) . When defined, [q]f,c,g = g(j) .  
(d) For any branching node a ,  if the daughters of a are j3 and y,  and j3 
dominates only an index j ,  [djf,C,g = [Ax :  y is in the domain of 
[ ]f,C,g[j�xl . 1h']f,C,g[j�xl] (where gfj-n] is  just like g but for the 
possible exception that gfj�x](j)=x).  
(e) For any index j ,  [Wj]f,c,g is defined only if: ( i)  g(j)E Ds; and (ii) 
whenever g and assignment(c) agree on j, g(j)=world(c) .  
Here is how the observed contrast between 1 and today is accounted for. 
Consider the SID in (4a) and the FID in (4b). 
(4) a. (John stared at me.) He thought that I would resign today. 
b. (John stared at me.) I would resign today(, he thought) . 
Assuming that the LF of the embedded clause in (4a) is :  [thatl 1 1 will resign-wI 
today] (where WI is the pronominal world argument of will resign and 1 - its 
syntactic binder) , (4a) is interpreted as in (5), relative to c, C, and g. For 
simplicity, we ignore some of the context parameters that think quantifies over. 
(In section 4 we discuss how the embedded past "disappears" . )  
(5) For all worlds w compatible with what John believes in world(c) at some 
time before time(c) (c=C), [1 will resign-wI today]f,C,g[ l�wl = 1 (i .e. , 
author(C) (=the speaker) will resign in w at the day surrounding time(C)). 
The pronoun WI is syntactically bound, so by (3c,d) it denotes w for every 
relevant world w. By (3b), 1 denotes author(C) ; today denotes the day surrounding 
time(c). By (3a) c=C, so time(c)=time(C). The LF of the embedded clause in (4b) 
is :  [1 will resign-wI today] , and (4b) is interpreted as in (6), relative to c, C, and g. 
(6) For all broad context-assignment pairs <c ' ,g'> such that c' is compatible 
with what John believes in world(c) at some time before time(c) (c=C) 
and g'=assignment(c ' ) , [1 will resign-wI today]f' ,C,g' = 1 (i .e . ,  author(C) 
(=the speaker) will resign at the day surrounding time(c ' )  in world(c ' )) .  
This time, WI has no syntactic binder but it is semantically bound: by (3c ,e) it  
denotes world(c ' ) ,  for every relevant c '  (assignment(c ' )=g' , so they agree on 1 ;  
this means that g' ( 1 )  is a world compatible with what John believes in the actual 
world) . By (3b), 1 denotes author(C), and today denotes,  for every relevant c ' ,  the 
day surrounding time(c ' )  (c ':;t:C, so it is the day surrounding the time where John, 
not the speaker, locates himself) . 
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The proposal also makes a nice prediction regarding definite descriptions. 
It is well known that in SID definite descriptions may have a 'wide scope' reading 
or a 'narrow scope' reading. But this is not so in FID (Doron 199 1 , Banfield 1982, 
Schlenker 1999, 2004), where only a 'narrow scope' reading is available. For 
example, in the SID in (7), the dean may be the actual dean or the dean according 
to Mary, but in the FID in (8), the dean is the dean according to Mary. 
(7) Mary believed that the dean was shy in his childhood. 
(8) The dean was shy in his childhood(, thought Mary). 
(9) spells out the two interpretations of (7). In the 'narrow' interpretation, the 
pronominal world argument of dean is syntactically bound. In the 'wide'  
interpretation, it is syntactically free, and by (3c,e), it denotes world(c) (g [ l�w] 
and assignment(c) agree on 2, because assignment(c) = g). Since c=C, the world 
argument of dean denotes world(C) (the actual world) . 
(9) a. 'Narrow scope' LF of embedded clause: [ 1 the dean-WI was shy-wd 
For all w compatible with what Mary believed in world(C), [the dean­
WI was shy-wI1f,C,g[ l�w]= 1  (the dean in w was shy in w). 
b.  'Wide scope' LF of embedded clause: [1 the dean-w2 was shy-wd 
For all w compatible with what Mary believed in world(C), [the dean­
W2 was shy-wI1f,c,g[ l�w]=1  (the dean in world(C) was shy in w).  
( 10) spells out the interpretation of (8) . The world argument of dean is 
syntactically free (though semantically bound), so it doesn' t  matter how we index 
it: by (3c,e) it denotes world(c ' )  no matter what its index is .  
( 10) LF of embedded clause: [the dean-wll2 was shy-wd 
For all <c ' ,g '> such that c' is compatible with what Mary believed in 
world(C) and g'=assignment(c ' ) , [the dean-wll2 was shy-wIlfC,g' = 1 (the 
dean in world(c ' )  was shy in world(c ' )) .  
Why can' t  the free pronominal world argument of  dean be interpreted as 
world(C) in ( 1O)? According to the theory sketched here, this is because it has no 
access to the assignment supplied by the "matrix" (i .e. , utterance) context. I argue 
that this is characteristic of pronouns in FID :  in the default case, their values are 
not fixed by the matrix assignment, and they cannot be interpreted 'de re ' .  
3. More FID/SID Contrasts: 'De Re' Readings of Pronominal Expressions 
I use the term 'de re' pronoun to talk about a syntactically free pronoun in an 
"attitude" environment that reflects the speaker' s  point of view (e.g . ,  W2 in (9b)) .  
A "null" pronoun is a pronoun that is interpreted as a world/time where the 
attitude holder locates himself (e.g . ,  WI in (5) and (6) ; the past tense in ( 1 )) , or an 
individual he takes himself to be (e.g . ,  he in ( 1 )) .  "Null" pronouns can be 
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syntactically bound (e.g. , WI in (5» or free (e.g . ,  WI in (6» . I use the term 'de 
dicto' pronoun to talk about a syntactically free pronoun that is not "null", but still 
reflects the attitude holder' s point of view (examples are given below) .  In this 
section I show that pronouns in FID are usually not 'de re' pronouns.  At a first 
glance, this claim seems false. 
3. 1 .  Apparent 'de re ' readings of 3rd person pronouns in FID 
If we construct an example of FID with a syntactically free 3rd person pronoun, 
we get the impression that it is possible to treat it as a 'de re' pronoun. 
( 1 1 )  John looked at Bill. He wanted to tell him something now, h e  could feel it. 
John: ' 'This guy wants to tell me something now, I can feel it." 
The second sentence in ( 1 1 )  is FID . Since John is reported to have a thought about 
Bill, it makes sense to interpret he as referring to Bill. This seems to indicate that 
he is a 'de re' pronoun in ( 1 1 ) . Furthermore, a free 3rd person pronoun in FID 
seems to behave in the same way as it does in SID in scenarios involving 
identification errors . To see this, let us first look at the SID in ( 1 2) (constructed 
after Quine' s  1956 famous example), which has a reading that doesn ' t  imply that 
John has contradictory beliefs . This reading comes about when John sees Mary on 
two different occasions and fails to recognize that he sees the same person. Based 
on the first encounter he attributes to Mary the property of being a spy, and based 
on the second encounter he attributes to her the property of not being a spy. 
( 12) John believes that Mary is a spy, and at the same time, he believes that 
Mary is not a spy. 
If we replace Mary with a pronoun that refers to Mary, we get the same effect. 
( 13) John believes that she is a spy, and at the same time, that she i s  not a spy. 
FID is different. A contradictory-beliefs reading arises with a name; but a reading 
that doesn' t  imply contradictory beliefs is possible with a pronoun. 
( 14) #Mary was a spy(, thought John listening to a recording of Mary' s voice). 
Mary wasn ' t  a spy(, thought John, listening at the same time to a different 
recording of Mary' s voice). 
( 1 5) She was a spy(, thought John, listening to a recording of Mary' s voice) . 
She wasn 't a spy(, thought John, listening at the same time to a different 
recording of Mary' s voice) . 
The oddity of ( 14) suggests that it attributes to John contradictory beliefs .  This in 
tum suggests that names in FID , like definite descriptions (see (8» , are interpreted 
as having 'narrow' scope. ( 1 5), however, does not imply that John entertains 
contradictory beliefs . Therefore, ( 1 5) seems to indicate that she may receive a 'de 
re' interpretation in FID. Nevertheless ,  I claim that this pronoun is not a 'de re ' 
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pronoun (but rather a 'de dicto' pronoun) .  I now introduce data that show that 3r
d 
person pronouns and the present tense cannot be 'de re' pronouns in FID. 
3.2. Gender identification errors 
In scenarios where an individual forms a belief about someone regarding whose 
gender he is mistaken, we observe a contrast between FID and SID, when we 
report that. Suppose John sees Bill (a male individual) in a dress, and mistakes 
him for a female individual . John mutters : "Really, she looks great, and she is 
staring at me." If we report this using FID, there is a preference for using she, and 
not he, to refer to Bill (even though for us, Bill is a male) .4 
( 16) John was convinced that Bill was a woman. Really, she/#he looked great(, 
he muttered), and she/#he was staring at him. 
This is explained if 3r
d 
person pronouns in FID are not 'de re ' pronouns. If it were 
possible to treat he as a 'de re' pronoun here we would have no preference for 
using she, since we, unlike John, take Bill to be a male. She i s  a 'de dicto' 
pronoun here, reflecting John' s  point of view rather than the speaker ' s .  Even if we 
don' t  tell our audience about John' s  mistake, they will still be able to reconstruct 
what he said (and infer his mistake). But if we report what happened using SID, 
we have to use he (which in this case is a 'de re ' pronoun, reflecting the speaker' s  
point of view). 
( 17) John didn' t  realize that Bill was a man. He said that he/#she looked great 
and that he/#she was staring at him. 
One way to rescue she in ( 17) is to treat it as an E-type pronoun, but this is 
possible only if there is an overt antecedent preceding she, as in ( 1 8) , where the 
antecedent is a woman and she is shorthand for the woman he thought he saw. 
( 1 8) John looked at Bill and thought he saw a woman. He said that he/she 
looked great, and that he/she was staring at him. 
How do we know that she is not an E-type pronoun in ( 1 6)? Without an overt 
antecedent, she would still be acceptable, as shown in ( 1 9) .  
( 19) John didn' t  realize that Bill was a man. Really, she/#he looked great(, he 
muttered), and she/#he was staring at him. 
3.3. The unavailability of 'double access ' readings in FID 
It is well known that in English SID, a present tense embedded under a past tense 
refers to a time that overlaps the utterance time. This is illustrated in (20) . Such 
readings are called 'double access '  readings, because of the inference in (20b), 
which requires at least two times to be included in the time of the pregnancy. 
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(20) Three days ago, John found out that Mary is pregnant. 
==> a. John to himself: "Mary is pregnant (now)" 
==> b. Mary' s pregnancy stretches (at least) from three days ago to 
the utterance time. 
In this respect, the present tense differs dramatically from the past tense in 
English. This is illustrated by the contrast between (2 1 )  and (22) .  
(2 1 )  Two years ago, John found out that Mary was pregnant. 
==> John to himself: "Mary is pregnant (now)" 
(22) #Two years ago, John found out that Mary is pregnant. 
(2 1 )  is fine because English, being a Sequence-of-Tense (SOT) language, allows a 
tense embedded under an agreeing tense to be a "null" time-denoting pronoun 
(i .e. , a relative "now") rather than an "anteriority" time-denoting pronoun. Since 
find out is factive and the finding out is in the past, the actual pregnancy takes 
place in the past. (22) is odd because the time denoted by the present tense (the 
pregnancy time) is required to stretch from two years ago into the utterance time. 
This contradicts common knowledge regarding normal (human) pregnancies . 
This explanation of the facts is possible under the assumption (Abusch 
1 997, Heim 1994 among others) that the English present tense in SID is a 'de re ' 
pronoun whose presuppositions require it to denote a time overlapping the 
utterance time.s Now, if we look at tenses in English FID, we notice that: (a) 
present-under-past is marginal at best;6 (b) past-under-past and present-under­
present (where the embedding present may be a "historical" present) are 
acceptable; and (c) in any event, an embedded present need not denote a time that 
overlaps the time in which the story is told (the utterance time) . 
(23) a. #She is pale today, said Mary as she stared into the horizon. 
b. She was pale today(, said Mary as she stared into the horizon). 
c. She is pale today(, says Mary, staring into the horizon). 
Mary: "I am pale today." 
(23b) is good because the embedded past is "null" (a SOT effect, cf. (2 1 )) .  
Neither (23c) nor the marginal (23a) (provided we accept it) imply that the time of 
Mary' s  paleness (or whatever it is that leads her to say she is pale) extends into 
the time where the story is told. This is explained if the present in FID cannot be 
interpreted 'de re ' .  The marginality of (23a) suggests that there is a preference for 
a "null" present in FlO , and that (23c) is good because of that : morphologically, 
the matrix tense (silent or not) is present, and it agrees with the embedded tense. 
3.4. Condition BIC effects 
Condition B of the Binding Theory usually prevents co-arguments of a verb from 
having the same reference (unless one of them is a reflexive pronoun) .  This is 
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why usually, ShelMary likes her cannot mean that Mary likes Mary. This effect is 
preserved in complement clauses of attitude verbs, as shown below. Consider the 
following scenario. John is looking at Mary. He doesn' t  recognize her; in fact he 
has no idea who he is looking at. He mutters : "Mary doesn' t  know her. I 'm sure 
of this ." If we report what happened to someone else, there is a contrast between 
the resulting FID and SID reports. 
(24) John looked at Mary. He didn ' t  recognize her. #He muttered to himself 
that Mary/she didn' t  know her and that he was sure of that. 
(25) John looked at Mary. He didn' t  recognize her. Mary/she didn ' t  know her; 
he was sure of this(, he muttered to himself). 
(24) is not a good way to report what John said, because the embedded she and 
her are 'de re' pronouns,  and reflect our point of view (as does Mary). Since we 
know that John is looking at Mary, a Condition B violation arises . (25) is good 
because neither she nor her are 'de re' pronouns .  Rather, they are 'de dicto ' 
pronouns, and reflect John' s  point of view (as does Mary). As such they may refer 
to different individuals .  Even if the audience of (25) is not aware of John' s  
mistake, they will still be able to reconstruct what he said (and infer his mistake). 
This doesn' t  seem to be possible in (24). Notice that (24) can be rescued using the 
E-type strategy, but this requires an overt antecedent for shelher (cf. ( 1 8)). 
(26)-(27) make a similar point regarding Condition C (which often 
prevents a pronoun from being coreferential with a name it c-commands). 
(26) John looked at Mary. He didn ' t  recognize her. #He thought that she didn ' t  
know Mary. 
(27) John looked at Mary. He didn ' t  recognize her. She didn ' t  know Mary(, he 
thought) . 
3.5. The antecedent options of it/that 
It is well known that it and that may refer back to a proposition, as shown in (28) .  
(28) John believes that Mary is a spy. But it/that isn ' t  true. Mary is not a spy. 
The proposition that serves as the antecedent of it/that is 'that Mary is a spy' . For 
convenience, let us represent this proposition as the ordered pair <Mary, Spy>. 
For many (though admittedly not all) speakers, there is a contrast between 
FID and SID in terms of the kind of propositions that may serve as antecedents 
for it/that (cf. Sharvit 2003). This is best illustrated in a scenario where an 
individual sees a reflection of himself but thinks that he is looking at someone 
else, as reported in (29) and (30). The second sentence in (29) is SID. 
(29) John looked in the mirror, and failed to realize that what he was looking at 
was his own reflection. He thought that he was sick. It/that wasn' t  true. 
John was perfectly fine. ([it/that]] = <[he]] (=John), SICK» 
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This text is unproblematic .  It/that refers to the proposition <.John, SICK> which is 
formed by taking the referent of he and the SICK property. Since he is  a 'de re ' 
pronoun, the referent of he is John. It/that wasn 't true denies the truth of <.John, 
SICK>. When we switch to FID , we get a different result: 
(30) John looked in the mirror, and failed to realize that what he was looking at 
was his own reflection. He was sick(, thought John). It/that wasn' t  true. 
#John was perfectly fine. ([it/that] = <[he] (tJohn) ,  SICK» 
The result is odd because we are negating the proposition formed of the referent 
of he and SICK. But the referent of he is not John now. This is because he is not 
interpreted 'de re ' (but rather 'de dicto ' ,  from John' s  point of view) .  
To sum up, pronouns can be interpreted 'de re ' in SID, but not in FID. 
This is explained by our rendition of Doron' s  proposal . 'De re ' pronouns are free 
pronouns that receive their values from the matrix assignment. Quantifying over 
broad contexts in FID means that syntactically free pronouns "trapped" in FID do 
not receive their values from the matrix assignment. Some of them are "null", and 
those that are not are 'de dicto ' pronouns.  
4. The proposal 
4. 1 .  General assumptions 
In addition to the rules in (3), we need a system that accounts for "null" pronouns .  
For example (see ( 1 )) , we need to account for the fact that a past embedded under 
another past in English may refer to a time where the attitude holder locates 
himself (simultaneous 'de nunc ' interpretation, to borrow von Stechow' s  (2003) 
term), and that a 3rd person pronoun may refer to whoever the attitude holder 
takes himself to be ( 'de se' interpretation) .  To this end, I assume a feature deletion 
mechanism (in the style of Schlenker 1999, Heim 200 1 , and von Stechow 2003 ; 
ct. Kratzer 1998). More concretely, I assume that in unembedded environments 
past and he carry two indices (the subscripts in (3 1 )-(32)), and features (the 
superscripts in (3 1 )-(32)) that provide presuppositions applicable to the indices 
( '<' stands for the +PAST feature, and ' 3M' stands for 3rd person masculine) . 
(3 1 )  For any indices k,j , lJPastk,j<If,c,g is defined only if: a. g(k) and g(j) E Dj, 
b. g(j) precedes g(k), and 
c .  whenever g and assignment(c) agree on k ,  g(k) = time(c) .  
When defined, lJPastk/If,c,g = g(j) .  
(32) For any indices k,j , [hek/MIf,C,g is defined only if: 
a. g(k) and g(j) E De, 
b. g(j) is a male in c, and 
c .  whenever g and assignment(c) agree on k,  g(k) = author(c) .  
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When defined, [lhek./M]f,c,g = gO) .  
In SOT languages such as English, when past is c-commanded by an agreeing 
tense, and in Sequence-of-Person languages such as English, when he is c­
commanded by an agreeing phrase, they may "lose" the second index (and with it, 
the relevant superscripts/presuppositions), as long as the first index is bound 
(syntactically or semantically) .7 ,8 Then, they are interpreted as follows :  
(33) For any k, (JPastt]f,C,g is defined only if: g(k)E Di and whenever g and 
assignment(c) agree on k, g(k)=time(c) .  When defined, (JPastk'-;]f,C,g = g(k) . 
(34) For any k, [lhek3M]f,C,g is defined only if: g(k)E De and whenever g and 
assignment(c) agree on k, g(k)=author(c) .  When defined, [lhek3M]f,c,g=g(k) . 
Our assumptions about SID are not very different from von Stechow' s  (among 
others) .  Still, we go over some examples in detail so that the reader can appreciate 
the predictions concerning FID. We predict SID to support 'de re' pronouns,  FID 
to support 'de dicto' pronouns, and both FID and SID to support "null" pronouns. 
4.2. SID 
(35) is a well-known example, which illustrates a 'de re' / 'de se' ambiguity 
exhibited by 3rd person pronouns embedded under attitude verbs.  
(35) Kaplan believed that his pants were on fire. 
a. Kaplan to himself: "this guy' s pants are on fire" 
b. Kaplan to himself: "my pants are on fire" 
( 'de re' )  
( 'de se ' l"null") 
(36) and (37) provide the LFs of (35a) and (35b) respectively (where the verbs 
take time arguments in addition to world arguments). We assume that believe is a 
universal quantifier over world-time-individual triples, and its clausal 
complement denotes a function from such triples to truth values. We also assume 
that the abstraction indices needed for that are freely supplied by the syntax (4 is 
an individual-abstractor, 2 - a time-abstractor, and 1 - a world-abstractor) : 
(36) de re: Kaplan3M past6,7< believe-w8 4 2 1 [his9,lM pants pastt be-WI onfire] (37) de se: Kaplan3M past6,7< believe-w8 4 2 1 [his4
3M pants pastt be-WI onfire] 
In (37) he is syntactically bound, and the past tense is syntactically bound in (36) 
and (37). The relevant features are deleted. This is allowed by our deletion 
mechanism, as past agrees with past and helhis agrees with Kaplan (both being 
3M). In (36) helhis is free and retains its features. We thus obtain (38) and (39). 
(38) 'De re' interpretation (corresponding to (36» : 
When defined, [Kaplan3M past6,7 < believe-w8 4 2 1 [his9,lM pants past2'-; be-WI on fire] ]f,C,g = 1 iff for all individual-time-world triples <x,t,w> 
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compatible with what Kaplan believes in world(C) at [fpast6,7 <]f,C,g, 
[his9.lM pants pastt' be-wI onfire]f,e,g[4-n, 2�t, I�w] = 1 .  
Iff for all <x,t, w> compatible with what Kaplan believes in world(C) at 
[fpast6,7 <]f,e,g, the pants of g(3) are on fire in w at t. 
(39) 'De se' interpretation (corresponding to (37» : 
When defined, [Kapian3M past6,7< believe-w8 4 2 1 [hislM pants pastt' be­WI on fire]]f,e,g = 1 iff for all individual-time-world triples <x,t,w> 
compatible with what Kaplan believes in world(C) at [fpast6,7<]f,e,g, [hiS4
3M 
pants pastz''  be-wI onfire ]f,e,g[4�x, 2�t, I�w] = 1 .  
Iff for all <x,t,w> compatible with what Kaplan believes in world(C) at 
[fpast6,7 <]f,C,g, the pants of x are on fire in w at t .  
The interpretation of helhis in (36) depends on g[4�x, 2�t, l�w] (by (32» , 
which agrees with assignment(c) on the value assigned to 3 (by (3a), 
g=assignment(c» . Since c=C (by (3a» , we get a 'de re' pronoun. In (37), helhis is 
bound and it is interpreted as whoever Kaplan takes himself to be (by the 
semantics of believe) . Since past is bound, it is interpreted as Kaplan ' s  "now". 
It is important to bear in mind that (38) is a mere simplification of the 
"correct" 'de re' analysis ,  according to which he is a semantic argument of believe 
(see Cresswell and von Stechow 1982, among others) .  Kaplan may fail to identify 
the referent of he properly (cf. ( 12),  ( 13 » . This requires that the description that 
Kaplan uses for the referent of he be the same as the description that actually fits 
that referent, though it may pick out different individuals in the actual world and 
in the worlds compatible with Kaplan' s  beliefs .9 
(40) "Correct" 'de re' interpretation: 
There is a suitable individual-concept k (e.g . ,  [AXE De • AtE Di . AWE Ds • 
the unique y such that x sees y in w at tD such that 
k(Kaplan)([fpast6,7 <]f,e,g)(world(C» = g(3),  and for all <x,t,w> compatible 
with what Kaplan believes in world(C) at [fpast6,7 <]f,C,g, the pants of 
k(x)(t)(w) are on fire in w at t. 
4.3. FID 
Following a suggestion in Schlenker 1999, I assume that the (silent) Fill operator 
(much like believe), takes an individual (the protagonist of the story - the attitude 
holder) , a world (in which the story takes place) , and a time (in which the story 
takes place) as arguments, and then a fourth argument, a "clausal" one. I assume 
that feature deletion under agreement works here too: a c-commanding past tense 
may trigger "deletion" of an embedded past, I O and a c-commanding 3rd person 
masculine noun phrase may trigger "deletion" of a 3rd person masculine pronoun. 
For example, the Fill he liked Mary(, thought John) may be represented as in 
(4 1) .  We will see below that the undeleted indices are semantically bound as 
required by the deletion mechanism. (SW is the world in which the story takes 
place which, for convenience, we take to be the actual world.) 
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As a first attempt, let us take (42) to be the semantics of the FID operator. 
(42) For any individual x, time t, world w, and function f from broad context­
assignment pairs to truth values, [FIDlf'c,g(x)(t)(w)(f) = 1 iff for all 
context-assignment pairs <c ' ,g '> such that c '  is compatible with what x 
believes/says in w at t and g' =assignment(c ' ) ,  f(c ' )(g ' )= 1 .  
Notice that there i s  a type mismatch between what the clausal complement of FID 
denotes according to (4 1 )  (Le. ,  something of type 't' ) and what FID requires it to 
denote according to (42). The rule in (43) resolves this mismatch, and also 
enables feature "deletion" (as the undeleted indices become semantically bound) . 
(43) MFA ("Monstrous" Functional Application; cf. Heim and Kratzer 1998) 
If a is a branching node whose daughters are (3,y and [AC '  . Ag' . lIYlf' ,C,g' ] 
is in the domain of IIJ3If,C,g, then [aIf,C,g =  IIJ3lf,C,g( [AC ' . Ag' . IIYIf' ,C,g' ] ) .  
Now let us  look at (44), which is ambiguous in  a way similar to (35) .  
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
He looked tired today(, thought John). 
a. John to himself: "I look tired today."  ( 'de se ' )  
b .  John to himself: "this guy looks tired today." ( 'de dicto ' )  
'de se' LF: FID<1ohn3M,pasts.6<'sw> [hel
3M pastt look-w3 tired today] 
'de dicto' LF: FID<1ohn3M,pasts.6<,sw> [hel ,lM pastt look-w3 tired today] 
'De se ' interpretation (corresponding to (45» : 
When defined, [FID<1olm3M,pasts.6<'sw> [hel
3M pastt look-w3 tired today] If,C,g 
= 1 iff for all context-assignment pairs <c ' ,� ' >  such that c '  is compatible 
with what John believes at [Jpasts,6 <If' ,g in world(C) and g' = 3M o4i ' c ' assignment(c ' ) , [he I past2 look-w3 tired today If '  ,g = 1 .  
Iff for all <c ' ,g '> such that c '  is compatible with what John believes at 
[Jpasts,6<If,C,g in world(C) and g'=assignment(c ' ) ,  author(c ' )  looks tired in 
world(c ' )  at time(c ' )  at the day surrounding time(c ' ) .  
'De dicto' interpretation (corresponding to  (46» : 
When defined, [FID<1ohn3M,pasts.6<,Sw>[hel ,lM past204i look-w3 tired today] If,C,g 
= 1 iff for all context-assignment pairs <c ' ,g' > such that c '  is compatible 
with what John believes at [Jpasts ,6 <If,C,g in world(C) and 
g '=assignment(c ' ) ,  [hel ,lM past204i look-w3 tired today If
' ,C,g' = 1 .  
Iff for all <c ' ,g> such that c '  is compatible with what John believes at 
[Jpasts,6<If,c,g in world(C) and g'=assignment(c ' ) ,  g' (4) looks tired in 
world(c ' )  at time(c ' )  at the day surrounding time(c ' ) .  
In (45)  he has a free index and a deleted feature; its value is fixed by 
assignment(c ' )  (see (34» as author(c ' ) .  In (46) he has two free indices and no 
deleted features; its value is fixed by assignment(c ' )  (see (32» as some male in c ' .  
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But according to (48), there is no connection at all between the value 
assigned by assignment(c ' )  to he and the value assigned to it by assignment(C) . 
Technically, we should establish such a connection (since John is acquainted with 
the referent of he). We want the description that John uses for the referent of he to 
be the description that actually fits that referent (as we do in 'de re ' belief reports, 
see (40)), though this description may pick out different individuals in the actual 
context and in the contexts compatible with John ' s  beliefs . Therefore, we have to 
enrich the semantics of FID with a presupposition that guarantees this (see (49)­
(50)). We thus obtain (5 1 )  as the relevant presuppositions of (46). 
(49) Revised semantics for the FID operator: 
For any individual x, time t, world w and function f such that f is a 
function from broad context-assignment pairs to truth values, 
[FIDlf,C,g(x)(t)(w)(f) is defined only if all context-assignment pairs 
<c ' ,g' > such that c' is compatible with what x believes/says in w at t and 
g' =assignment(c ' ) ,  are compatible with C relative to <x,t,w>. 
When defined, [FIDlf,C,g(x)(t)(w)(f) = 1 iff for all context-assignment 
pairs <c ' ,g' > such that c '  is compatible with what x believes in w at t and 
g' =assignment(c ' ) ,  f(c ' )(g ' )= 1 .  
(50) c '  i s  compatible with C relative to <x,t,w> iff: for every j in 
Dom(assignment(c ' )) there is a suitable concept kj , such that: 
(i) assignment(C)(j) = kj{ <x, t, w» ; 
(ii) assignment(c ' )(j)  = kj{<author(c ' ) , time(c ' ) , world(c , » ) ; l 1 and 
(iii) whenever assignment(c ' )(j)=author(c ' ), assignment(C)(j)=x. 
(5 1 )  For all <c ' ,g '> such that c '  is  compatible with what John believes at 
[fpast5,/lf,C,g in world(C) and g' =assignment(c ' ) :  (a) g' ( 1 )  = k1 (author(c ' ))(time(c ' ))(world(c ' )) = author(c ' ) ;  
(b) g( 1 )  = k1 (John)([fpast5,6<lf,C,g)(world(C)) = John; (c) g' (4) = k4(author(c ' ))(time(c ' ))(world(c ' )) ;  and 
(d) g(4) = k4(John)([fpast5,6 <If,C,g)(world(C)). 
Accordingly, under the 'de dicto' reading, John may "disagree" with the speaker 
regarding the identity of the individual with whom he is acquainted. 
In sum, our system predicts that a 'de dicto' pronoun is possible in FID, 
but not in SID, where free pronouns in the embedded clause are 'de re' pronouns .  
Both SID and FID admit 'de se'/ ,de nunc ' pronouns (which are bound 
syntactically and/or semantically) . The reader may wonder why we designed the 
system in such a way so as to have the reference of free pronouns in FID be fixed 
by an assignment different from the matrix assignment (in other words, Why have 
we "created" 'de dicto ' pronouns?). And indeed, for cases such as (44b),  a system 
that treats he as a 'de re ' pronoun (whose value is fixed by the matrix assignment) 
would work just as well. The crucial job done by the embedded assignment 
becomes apparent when we look at those cases (discussed in section 3) where FID 
and SID contrast with each other with respect to the interpretation of free 
pronouns.  We now look at these examples again. 
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4.4. Explaining FIDISID contrasts 
In the scenario where John stares at Bill and thinks that he is a woman (3.2),  we 
noted a contrast between FID and SID with respect to the pronoun used to refer to 
Bill. The predicted interpretations are these ( '3F' stands for 3rd person feminine). 
(52) John said that he looked great. (cf. 1 7) 
For all <x,t,w> compatible with what John said in world(C) ,  [ he3.lM 
pasti"" look-wI great ]f'C,g[ l�w, 2�tl = 1 .  
(53) She looked great(, he said) . (cf. 1 6) 
For all <c ' ,g '> such that c '  is compatible with what John said in world(C) 
3F .... ' C ' and g' =assignment(c ' ) ,  [she3,4 past2 look-wI great If ' ,g = 1 .  
In the SID case, he i s  interpreted 'de re ' (and refers to Bill - a male in the actual 
world), but in the FID case, we have to use she in order to convey John ' s  point of 
view (and John thinks he is looking at a female). 
Similarly, when a present tense is embedded under an attitude verb (in 
English), it is interpreted 'de re ' .  Not so in FID (see discussion in 3 .3) .  
(54) a. John found out that Mary is pregnant. 
b. Mary is pregnant(, John is/#was thinking) . 
We assume that the present tense carries a -PAST feature, and that it may lose this 
feature under agreement. We get (56) and (57) for (54a) and (54b) respectively. 
(55) [presi/lf,c,g is defined only if gO) overlaps g(i) and g(i)=time(c) .  When 
defined, [presi/lf,C,g = gO). 
(56) For all <x,t,w> compatible with what John believed in world(C),  [ Mary 
pres3,5° be pregnant-wIlf,c,g
[ I�Wl=1  ([pres3,5olf,C,g
[ l�wl overlaps time(C» 
(57) For all <c ' ,g'> S .t. c' is compatible with what John believes in C and g' = ' C ' 8 ' C ' assgnmnt(c ' ) ,  [ . . .  pres38 . . .  pregnant-wIlf ' ,g = 1 ([pres3 If ' ,g = time(c ' »  
I do not know where the preference for a "null" present (rather than a 'de dicto ' 
present, which would show itself in present-under-past FID; cf. (23a» comes 
from, but the crucial point here is that the system correctly bans 'de re ' present 
tense from FID (see Schlenker 2004 for a different view). 
Regarding Condition B/C effects (3 .4), the explanation for the contrast 
between (24) and (25) is based on the different points of view reflected by them. 
(58) #John muttered to himself that she didn't  know her (cf. 24) 
For all <x,t,w> compatible with what John said in world(C) ,  [ not she4,lF past2 .... knOW-WI her4/F If,C,g[ l�w, 2�tl = 1 .  
(59) She didn' t  know her(, he muttered to himself}. (cf. 25) 
For all <c ' ,g'> such that c '  is com�atible with what John said in world(C) 
and g'=assignment(c ' ) , [not she4,5 pastz"'" knOW-WI her4/F If
' ,C,g'= 1 .  
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In (58) c=C, and the pronouns are both 'de re' gronouns .  Since we know John is 
looking at Mary, [1\'he4,lFlf,C,g = [her4,lFlf' ,g (=Mary) . In (59), where the 
pronouns are interpreted 'de dicto' , the values supplied by g' for these pronouns 
are different. In other words, [she4,5
3F ]f' ,C,g' i: [her 4,lF If
' ,C,g' • 
Finally, consider again the antecedent options of it/that (section 3 . 5 ,  (29)­
(30)) . When he is  interpreted 'de re' (in the SID case), we get a good result, 
because it refers to the proposition <John, SICK>. But when he is interpreted 'de 
dicto' , we get an odd result because it cannot refer to this proposition. 
(60) John thought that he was sick. It wasn' t  true. John was perfectly fine. 
[it/thatlf,C,g = <[he6,lMlf,c,g (=John), SICK> (29) 
(6 1 )  He was sick(, thought John). It wasn' t  true. #John was perfectly fine. 
[it/thatlf,C,g = <[he6,lM]f' ,C,g' (i:John), SICK> (30) 
To sum up, the idea that the FID operator is a universal quantifier over 
context-assignment pairs , where 'context' is understood broadly, allows us to 
disallow 'de re' pronouns in FID. Recall, however, that I is interpreted in FID as 
the author of the matrix context. This is explained in the following way. By  
adding an index to  I we make i t  a variable (cf. Heim 200 1 ) .  B y  replacing the 
relevant part of (3b) with (62), we render it an inherently 'de re' pronoun. 
(62) For any index j ,  [Ijlf,c,g is defined only if assignment(C)U)  = author(C) .  
When defined, [Ijlf,c,g = gU). 
The presuppositions in (62) and in (49)) together guarantee the right interpretation 
of 1. Let us look at ( 1 )  (he would ask me3 to marry him) again. By  the 
presupposition in (62), assignment(C)(3) is the speaker. The embedded 
assignment may assign the index 3 a different value (reflecting the fact that John 
might fail to recognize me) . Still, the description that John uses to describe me to 
himself has to hold of me in the actual context as well (by (49)). You has a similar 
presupposition regarding the addressee. 
4.5. Can 'de dicto ' pronouns account/or 'de se '/'de nunc ' readings in FID ? 
There is a debate in the literature (Lewis 1979, Chierchia 1 989, Reinhart 199 1 ,  
Percus and Sauerland 2003, among others) concerning whether genuine "null" 
( 'de se '/ 'de nunc ' )  overt pronouns are really needed in the grammar of English. 
For example, it has been suggested that the 'de se' reading of Kaplan believes that 
his pants are on fire is a special case of the 'de re ' reading, where helhis happens 
to refer to the attitude holder, and the attitude holder happens to know that he is 
the person he is in contact with. Therefore, only a 'de re' LF is  needed. 
A similar question arises for tenses . Given that tenses may be interpreted 
'de re' (recall 'double access ' readings), can a 'de re' interpretation of a past tense 
account for simultaneous 'de nunc ' readings? Abusch ( 1 997) shows that this is 
not always possible. Crucially, in the following example, the most deeply 
embedded past tense (under the most natural interpretation of the sentence) refers 
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to a time of an event that occurs after the utterance time. A 'de re' interpretation 
of the past tense would require it to refer to a time before the utterance time. 
(63) A week ago, John decided that in ten days, during breakfast, he would tell 
his mother that he loved her. 
This means that we need to assume a feature deletion mechanism (or some such 
mechanism, with the same effects) that allows the embedded tenses to be 
interpreted without their anteriority presuppositions. 
(64) John past4,/ decide 2 he pastz"'" will tell his mother 3 he past3"' love her 
Since we have introduced 'de dicto ' pronouns, it makes sense to ask, can 
we claim that 'de se'I 'de nunc ' readings of FID are always special cases of 'de 
dicto ' readings? There are data that show that the answer is No. First, an example 
similar to (63) can be constructed using FID (cf. Kamp and Rohrer 1 983) .  
(65) Ten days from now, at breakfast, he would tell his mother that he loved 
her(, thought John a week ago). 
The reading where the loving is simultaneous with the telling cannot be captured 
either by a 'de dicto' LF or by a 'de re ' LF (which is excluded independently) . As 
for person pronouns, notice that (66a,b) (based on Banfield 1982 and Doron 199 1 )  
contrast i n  acceptability when Mary mistakenly thinks she i s  a man. 
(66) a. *He would make an excellent bishop(, thought Mary) . 
b .  She would make an excellent bishop(, thought Mary) . 
(66a) is bad despite the fact that he is a male in the contexts compatible with what 
Mary believes (see (32b» . This is because, just like we normally don ' t  use 3rd 
person pronouns to talk or think about ourselves (whatever the reason for this 
might be) , we normally cannot report someone else doing so. So the value of he is 
- in the normal case - distinct from the "embedded" author (Mary, or whoever 
Mary takes herself to be) .  (66b) is good because she is a 'de se' pronoun, whose 
gender features are deleted at LF under agreement with Mary. It is not a 'de re ' 
pronoun because we have excluded 'de re ' pronouns independently. It is not a 'de 
dicto' pronoun either, since we know from ( 1 6)-( 1 7) that the gender features of 
'de dicto' pronouns reflect the beliefs that the attitude holder has regarding the 
gender of the individual corresponding to it. (The reader is referred to Percus and 
Sauerland 2003 for an argument for genuine 'de se' pronouns based on SID.) 
5. Conclusion 
The behavior of pronouns in SID vs. FID suggests that the FID operator quantifies 
over broad contexts. On the other hand, the behavior of English attitude verbs is 
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better understood if we don't  regard them as quantifiers over broad contexts . It 
would be interesting to see, given this ,  how 3rd person pronouns behave in 
languages where attitude verbs have been argued to be quantifiers over contexts 
on the basis of the shifted reference of various types of expressions in 
complement clauses of such verbs (Anand and Nevins 2004). If it turns out that 
these languages systematically ban 'de re' pronouns in the relevant cases, this 
might show that natural languages never use narrow contexts (and Schlenker' s 
claim that all attitude verbs quantify over contexts might tum out to be incorrect). 
Endnotes 
*For very valuable comments, I thank the audience of SALTI4, and the audiences 
who attended the talks I gave at MIT, UMass, Brown University, UConn, Tel­
Aviv University, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Tuebingen, 
and Tokyo University. Special thanks go to Philipppe Schlenker for our 
continuous and continuing discussions. All errors are of course mine. 
1 See Banfield ( 1982) regarding pragmatic restrictions on the use of lime in FID. 
2 Other time-adverbials that behave like this are this week, tomorrow, yesterday, 
etc . See Banfield and Doron for discussion of adverbs such as really (see also 
( 16)), which are fine in FID but not in SID. 
3 In addition, for any root node S, no free and bound occurrences of the same 
index may occur in S .  
4 Judgments reported in Schlenker 2004 (which I do not share) conflict with these. 
S This doesn' t  explain why the pregnancy must also stretch into the past. See 
references cited for possible explanations of this fact. 6 Schlenker (p.c.) points out correctly that present tense in FID is good in generic 
or characterizing sentences . For space limitations I do not go into this here. 7 Also, the binder and the bindee must be interpreted relative to the same (big) C .  
8 Actually, [fpastk/] is shorthand for [fpas(]([tkID([tjID (so [fpas(] is of  type 
<i ,<i,i» ), and [fpastk'"'] is shorthand for [fpast'"']([tkID (so [fpast'"'] is of type <i ,i» . 
Similar comments apply to he. 
9 See Cresswell and von Stechow ( 1982), Heim ( 1994), and Percus and Sauerland 
(2003) a.o . ,  for suggestions as to how this meaning is read off the syntax . 
1 0  Having an overt FID operator affords a simple account of SOT facts in FID. 
Notice that in non-SOT languages, the present serves as the "local" evaluation 
time in embedded clauses, in SID and FID (see Borer 198 1 ,  Sharvit 2003). 
1 1  Paul Portner has pointed out to me that this semantics raises some issues 
regarding the introduction of new discourse referents in FID, and the use of 
pronouns to refer to them. I leave these problems open for now. 
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